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The Mind, the Brain, and the Law
Abstract
In this chapter, we explore the potential influence that advances in neuroscience may have on legal
decision makers and present the findings from some recent studies that probe folk intuitions concerning
the relationships among neuroscience, agency, responsibility, and mental illness. We first familiarize the
reader with some of the early research in experimental philosophy on people's intuitions about agency
and responsibility. Then, we focus on a more specific issue—namely, whether people respond to
explanations of human behavior framed in neuroscientific terms differently than they respond to
explanations framed in more traditional folk psychological terms. Next, we discuss some new findings
which suggest that explanations of criminal behavior that are couched in neural terms appear to make
people less punitive than explanations couched in mental terms, especially in the context of mental
illness. Finally, we offer what we take to be the best explanation of these differences in people's
intuitions—namely, when people are presented with neural explanations of human behavior, they tend to
think that the agent's “deep self” (the values and beliefs the agent identifies with) is somehow left out of
the causal loop or bypassed, which in turn mitigates the agent's responsibility.
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